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Considering the Gerrymander
LEROY C. HARDY*
Despite the great expectations fostered by landmark cases
such as Baker v. Carr,' Reynolds v. Sims, 2 and Wesberry v.
Sims3 the quest for representative government is still frus-
trated, by the political manipulation commonly known as gerry-
mandering. The resultant unusual configuration on an electoral
district map elicits laughter and raised eyebrows. Its political
impact causes legal dilemmas that seemingly defy resolution.
As early as 1962 Dean Phil Neal of the Yale Law School alluded
to gerrymandering as the next problem to be met in the reappor-
tionment controversy4 and, in the interim the courts have grap-
* Professor of Political Science, California State University, Ph.D. Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles.
The writer's reapportionment experience includes the following: Assistant to
the Consultant of the Reapportionment Committee in 1951; Ph.D. dissertation
on the 1951 reapportionment; Consultant to the Reapportionment Committee in
1961; Consultant to the Governor (1964-1965) re: Senate and Assembly reappor-
tionment; Consultant to the Congressional delegation in 1965 and again in 1966-
67; Consultant for the City of Newport Beach redistricting in 1966; member of
Los Angeles Mayor's Committee on Redistricting in 1962; and Consultant to the
Congressional delegation in 1970-71.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
4. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT
REV. 252 (1962). Robert G. Dixon, Jr., refers to gerrymandering as our present
'second round' of apportionment litigation in his excellent DEMOCRATIC REPRE-
SENTATION REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITIcs, 466 (1968).
pled with Wright v. Rockefeller5 and timidly let go. One legal
journal article began with the challenging title: "Identifying
Gerrymanders." 6 In a recent symposium on reapportionment
one section was expectantly titled "Gerrymandering: Privileged
Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target?"'7 Another article-
"Quantitative and Descriptive Guidelines to Minimize Ger-
rymandering"-presumably attempted to offer guidelines.8 Un-
fortunately, despite the multitude of pages in law journals, polit-
ical science periodicals and other academic treatises, where
cases are properly noted and the cruelty to representative gov-
ernment is deplored, judges are still left without guidance for
reaching a solution of the gerrymandering problem. Terminol-
ogy difficulties and misconceptions have led the experts into
digressions from the principal issue.
Here let us take a tentative step toward clarifying of the na-
ture of gerrymandering. As Professor Robert Dixon, Jr., has
observed, any redistricting is a gerrymander because any line
drawn on a political map represents an electoral advantage for
someone.10 But to say that all redistricting is gerrymandering is
to confuse the issue. That makes a common political term mean-
ingless as a device to refine political and legal thinking. We here
contend that the gerrymander is a form of political manipula-
tion similar to bribery, vote stuffing, etc. Control of the tech-
nique requires an analysis of the species, delineation of its vari-
ations, and a method of detection. More precise terminology in
relation to the gerrymander technique will distinguish it from
other forms of electoral manipulation and enable the courts to
confront its worst features realistically. Fundamental to the
clarification of current misconceptions is a view beyond the
generalities based on illustrations of notorious gerrymanders.
Extreme disparities must be separated from the intent of total
redistricting within a state or other political unit.
5. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
6. Gottlieb, Identifying Gerrymanders, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 540 (1970-71).
7. G. Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial
Target?, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's, 121 (N.W. Polsby Ed. 1971).
8. G. Baker, Quantitative and Descriptive Guidelines to Minimize Ger-
rymandering, in Papayanopoulos, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION AND APPOR-
TIONMENT: QUANTITATIVE METHODS, MEASURES, AND CRITERIA, 219 ANNALS OF THE
NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 200 (1973).
9. The literature on reapportionment, redistricting and gerrymandering is
extensive. Two useful bibliographies are: R. Silva and J. Boyd, Selected Bib-
liography on Legislative Apportionment and Districting (1968) (mimeo-
graphed by the National Municipal League); and D. ALLEN, SR., LEGISLATIVE
SOURCEBOOK: THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE AND REAPPORTIONMENT 1849-1965 at
223 (1965).
10. R. DIXON, JR., supra note 4 at 460.
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To accomplish this goal we here consider: (1) origin of the
term and definitions, (2) classification, (3) analysis-what a ger-
rymander is not, (4) the incumbent factor, (5) guidelines, (6)
redistricting practices, and (7) the political essence. Let us hope
that this methodical approach to the gerrymander problem will
guide the courts in the next reapportionment.
la) The Term
Coining a Political Term: The origin of-the term gerryman-
der is one of the oft-told tales of American politics." In 1812 the
Democratic-Republican Party redistricted the State of Mas-
sachusetts to the detriment of the opposition Federalist Party.
Elbridge Gerry was governor at the time. One of the districts
had a peculiarly distorted contour as was clearly seen when The
Boston Weekly Messenger published a map of it. Soon after-
ward, the shape of the district was examined and discussed at a
dinner party where someone remarked, "The district needed
wings, and Mr. Tisdale, the artist, readily provided them making
the map of the district resemble a prehistoric monster." There-
upon one of the guests suggested the name "salamander" for it.
Someone else, probably Mr. Alsop, responded with, "Gerryman-
der is what you mean." Thus a term was coined that has since
been variously used as a noun and/or verb in American political
life. 1
2
Whether Governor Gerry had any influence in the actual crea-
tion of the district is questonable. 13 Still, he is involved, and thus
this illustrious founding father, later Vice-President, defender
of the ideal of popular government and annual elections, has
acquired an undeserved reputation for the "evil."'1 4 To attribute
gerrymandering to the governor ignores the fact that rivalry
between the legislature (which has responsibility for drawing
11. Among the better accounts of the use of the term are: E. GRIFFITH, RISE
OF THE GERRYMANDER IN THE UNITED STATES, Chapter 11 (1907); R. LUCE, LEGISLA-
TIVE PRINCIPLES, 395 (1930); and Griffin, The Gerrymander, 97 OUTLOOK 187
(1911).
12. Griffin, supra note 11 at 187. Not as well known is the short duration of
the infamous predator. In the Spring 1813 elections the Federalists captured the
district which prompted a cartoon in the form of a skeleton labeled: Hatched
1812. Died 1813. The cartoon is reproduced in Griffin, id.
13. G. BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY: FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN
STATESMAN, 317 (1976).
14. GRIFFITH, supra note 11 at 26.
district lines) and the executive was then more intense than it is
now. Executive interference would surely have been prohibited.
The political creature known as "gerrymander" was surely de-
vised by a legislature composed of individuals vitally interested
in their own electoral prospects.
Although Massachusetts' 1812 distortion is the classic exam-
ple, Mr. Elmer C. Griffith long ago revealed that the techniques
which produce gerrymanders had already long been practiced
in America. He ascertained that the first known appearance of a
district which could have been called a gerrymander occurred
in Pennsylvania as early as 1705.15 In North Carolina in 1732
gerrymanders were constructed to favor one section of the col-
ony over another. 16 One of the most clever of the gerrymanders
of the early period was discovered to have existed in New Jersey
in 1798.17 Another five were noted in New York between 1802
and 1809.18 James Madison faced the gerrymander monster
created by Patrick Henry who hoped to frustrate the career of
the future President.19
1 b) Definitions
According to Encyclopedia Britannica, a gerrymander is an
action "to alter unfairly or abnormally, as the political map of a
state, etc." As a noun, the term is "an unnatural and arbitrary
redistricting of a state or county. ' 20 The fifteenth edition says
that gerrymandering is a term used in U.S. politics "to describe
the drawing of boundaries of electoral districts, wards, and
other subdivisions, in order to give an unfair advantage to one
party over its rivals. '21 The same edition makes the point that
the 1812 action tended to consolidate the Federalist votes into
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. at 47.
17. Id. at 57-59.
18. Id. at 31-32.
19. Tyler observed that mere fortune prevented another founding father
from having his name blighted by the term "henrymander": M. TYLER, LIFE OF
HENRY, 352 (1966). Of passing interest is the fact that James Madison's second
Vice-President was none other than Elbridge Gerry. Another President, William
McKinley, also met the gerrymander several times. After frequent efforts of
similar design the Democratic redistricting of 1890 in Ohio accomplished
McKinley's defeat. MacNeil reports: "The people of Ohio resented McKinley's
ouster and promptly elected him governor. His overwhelming victory in the
gubernatorial race led to his nomination and election as President in 1896"; N.
MACNEIL, FORGE OF DEMOCRACY: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 140 (1963).
See also R. BROOKS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PROBLEMS, 477 (3rd ed.
1933).
20. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 1314 (1945).
21. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 509 (1975).
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new senatorial districts to give disproportionate representation
to the rival Democratic-Republicans.
22
Webster says that a gerrymander is "to divide (a state, county,
etc.) into election districts or other civil divisions in an unnatur-
al and unfair way, with a view to give one political party an
advantage over its opponent, or for some other improper pur-
pose . . hence to manipulate, as fact arguments, etc., in order
to gain an unfair advantage or to reach unwarranted conclu-
sions.23 The Random House Dictionary defines the term in this
manner: the dividing of a state, county, etc., into election dis-
tricts so as to give one political party a majority in many dis-
tricts while concentrating the voting strength of the other party
into as few a number of districts as possible.24
The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences article on ger-
rymandering describes the process as
the abuse of power whereby the political party dominant at the time in
a legislature arranges constituencies unequally so that its voting
strength may count for as much as possible at elections and that of the
other party or parties for as little as possible. To accomplish this
design it masses the voters of the opposing parties in a small number
of districts and so distributes its own voters that they can carry a large
number of districts by small majorities.2"
The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences does
not include gerrymandering, but in the apportionment article,
the term is defined as "the creation of artificial constituencies
with arbitrary boundaries that are consciously drawn for parti-
san advantage. '26
Certain common characterizations emerge from these "au-
thoritative" books. Gerrymandering is a technique used for par-
tisan purpose in the creation of constituencies. In the original
gerrymandering action and in the latest Random House defini-
tion the consolidation of opposition strength seems to be charac-
teristic. The term gerrymander is a noun which, precisely used
in a technical sense, has main qualifiers of "arbitrary" and
"unnatural." As a verb, gerrymandering indicates a redistrict-
22. Id.
23. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1052 (2nd ed. 1947).
24. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, 594 (1967).
25. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 638 (E. Seligman ed. 1931).
26. 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 368 (D. Sills
ed. 1968).
ing process which has been manipulated by the creation of
constituencies which are arbitrary, unnatural and unfair (in an
unequal vote sense). An electoral system that provides condi-
tional boundaries (e.g., each county will have one district, or all
seats in a given county will be elected at-large) is in a sense
creating constituencies having considerable impact on the polit-
ical process, but technically gerrymandering is the drawing of
lines within the confines of the electoral system. The electoral
system may be unfair from different normative perspectives,
but such manipulation is distinct from a manipulation of the
system itself for partisan purposes.
Although our consideration of classification will elaborate on
the concepts of "arbitrary" and "unnatural," in this discussion
of definition it is desirable to use an illustration to clarify the
nature of the qualifiers. Life magazine in 1951 published an
article categorizing a Cape Cod congressional district as a
member of the "Gerrymander Zoo. '27 The elongated, hooked
peninsula was naturally peculiar in shape, not an arbitrary cre-
ation but actually appropriate. In an excellent book on geog-
raphy and politics Professor Stanley Brunn used the 4th, 13th,
and 16th congressional districts of California to illustrate ger-
rymanders, but the features of those districts are also not arbi-
trary or unnatural, given the geographical terrain, county and
state boundaries and population concentrations with which re-
dictricters had to deal. 28 As subsequently noted, to judge ger-
rymanders it is essential to investigate carefully the political
intent, as well as geographical configurations of building blocks
and population concentrations, before determining the exist-
ence of a gerrymander.
2) Classification
On the basis of a study of congressional districts from 1870 to
the present and participation in the creation of districts in sever-
al redistrictings, six principal types of gerrymanders appear: (1)
silent, (2) concentrated, (3) elongated, (4) dispersed, (5) elimi-
nated, and (6) projected. The descriptive adjective indicates the
purpose for which each gerrymander was created; that is, the
arbitrary and/or unnatural reason for its creation.29 A sub-
species can be noted in one or two of the types.
27. Speaking of Pictures, Congressional Districts in the Gerrymandering
Zoo, LIFE, April 16, 1951, at 10.
28. S. BRUNN, GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 169 (1974).
29. This classification was originally developed in the author's Ph.D. dis-
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The Silent Gerrymander. A silent gerrymander results from
the failure of a reapportioning body (normally the legislature) to
redistrict the state despite significant population changes. The
common feature of a silent gerrymander has been the decision
of the reapportioning body not to act even though the constitu-
tion requires periodic redistricting. Inaction may perpetuate the
political power of one party in an arbitrary manner and also
violate constitutional provisions.
Throughout the nation many silent gerrymanders came into
existence between 1910 and 1929 because Congress failed to
reapportion the national legislative districts in accordance with
the 1920 Census. 30 Districts based upon the population of 1911
were left unchanged. Several states retained representation that
their population no longer justified, while other states were
denied representation that their population increases war-
ranted. Notably in the former category was Missouri and in the
latter California. 31
Failure of the Congress to act was coupled with a similar
sertation; L. Hardy, The California Reapportionment of 1951 at 391 (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1955) [hereinafter cited as
Reapportionment of 1951]. The initial pattern was elaborated in a paper deliv-
ered at the 1961 American Political Science Association Convention; L. Hardy,
The Theory and Practice of Reapportionment, Sept. 1960 (mimeographed
paper for the American Political Science Association). The present classifica-
tion represents a development on the basis of four redistricting experiences
since that time.
Other similar classifications have been produced, the most frequently cited
being: A. HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING, THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESEN-
TATION, 46 (1963). See also BRUNN, supra note 28, at 168-71; W. KEEFE and M.
OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 80-82 (2d
ed. 1968).
30. An overview of the congressional picture is found in E. Tanner, Con-
gressional Reapportionment, 1910 to 1930, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Uni-
versity of Texas, Austin, 1937). The definitive coverage of this period in the
California context is: G. Bemis, Representation in the California Legislature,
1911-31, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1935); See also F. HICHBORN, STORY OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE OF 1921
(1935) and Ahl, Reapportionment in California, 22 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV., 978
(1928). An overview of the California picture is included in Reapportionment of
1951, supra note 29, at 21-37, which is also liberally paraphrased in D. ALLEN, SR.,
supra note 9 at Ch. I.
31. Missouri, with a population of 3,629,267 in 1930 had 16 seats in the House
of Representatives and 18 electoral votes, while California with a 5,677,251
population had 11 House seats and 13 electoral votes. See, R. BROOKS, supra
note 19 at 480.
reluctance of many states to alter their legislative districts.
California was a prime example. In the early 1920s Southern
California and urban areas in general continued to grow more
rapidly than other parts of the state. Northern and rural legis-
lators refused to redistrict the state, despite constitutional pro-
visons requiring a reapportionment every ten years, with repre-
sentation in both houses to be based on population. 32 Districts
no longer justified by population became silent gerrymanders.
Resistance on the national and state levels to reapportionment
was an attempt to ignore the great transition in American life
from a rural to an urban society. "Status quo" elements natural-
ly fought vigorously the realignment of districts which would
deplete their political power. In state after state population as
the basis for representation in both houses meant the newly
populated areas would ultimately take control of the legislature.
California's solution to the impasse was approval of an initia-
tive measure to change the basis of representation in the upper
house. Thereafter in the state senate no county could have more
than one senator, and no more than three counties could be
grouped in one senatorial district.33 Rural and northern ele-
ments were thereby given dominance in the Senate by the in-
troduction of area as the basis of representation.
In this process silent gerrymanders were eliminated and a
new sub-specie of gerrymander was created-the constitutional
gerrymander. 34 In effect, the constitutionally-stipulated criteria
(for at least one house) made alteration of districts (or con-
stituencies) impossible. Compromise was bought at a great
price. The democratic promise of "one man one vote" was ex-
changed for acres and trees in the "cow counties." As the popu-
lation continued to shift toward urban areas, the distance from
''one man one vote" increased; now with constitutional sanction,
whereas the former silent gerrymanders could have been al-
tered by legislative action. Constitutional stipulations allowed
little alteration of senate districts and virtually froze representa-
tion in the upper house regardless of future population shifts.
A decade of inaction on the national level finally prompted a
32. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 6 (West 1954) (as enacted in 1879).
33. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 6 (West 1954) (as amended in 1926).
34. Gus Tyler and David I. Wells entitle their useful chapter, New York:
'Constitutionally Republican', in THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT, 221 (M.
Jewell ed. 1962). Possibly the classic example of the constitutional gerrymander
was the county-unit rule in Georgia; see GOSNELL, The Gerrymander System in
Georgia, 11 SOCIAL FORCES 570-73 (1933) and Gray v. Sanders, 374 U.S. 368
(1963). Gosnell termed the unit rule in Georgia a "double-barrel" gerrymander.
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reapportionment in 1929 on the threshold of another census.
The resultant delay brought significant changes. California in-
creased its representation from 11 to 20, seven of those going to
Los Angeles County, whereas Missouri lost three seats. The
deplorable inaction, broken only after years of difficult negotia-
tion, must be judged from the perspective that national legis-
lators were unwilling to yield representation to urban areas in
the "grand depository" of popular will, despite the fact that the
U.S. Senate protected small states on the basis of the federal
principle. National legislators were not alone in their foot-
dragging. Despite the acquiescence to constitutional gerryman-
ders in one house by many states, obstructive reluctance to
redistrict was still manifest on the state level and congressional
districts were not necessarily balanced. Conservative forces in-
side and outside the state legislatures continually blocked ac-
tion and silent gerrymanders proliferated. Two significant
cases-Colegrove v. Green35 and Baker v. Carr36-originated
from legislative inaction that spawned silent gerrymanders. In
Colegrove the complaint centered on congressional districts in
Illinois that had not been reapportioned since 1901, while in
Baker the Tennessee state legislative districts also had not been
altered since that date.3 7 In Tennessee, for example, the Shelby
County District in 1901 had a population of 153,557 compared to
the White County district's 15,577. By 1960 the former district
had 627,019 people while the latter district had 14,157. In Califor-
nia the smallest state senatorial district in 1930 had 7,915 people
compared to Los Angeles' 2,208,492, or a ratio of 1 to 279, but by
1960 the smallest had 14,294 and Los Angeles 6,380,711, or a ratio
of almost 1 to 450.38
In response to such flagrant disparities and the failure of
legislatures to act, the federal courts moved into the reappor-
tionment thicket39 and eventually struck down the state con-
stitutional stipulations that implemented the constitutional ger-
35. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
36. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. The Baker v. Carr litigation is reviewed in G. GRAHAM, ONE MAN, ONE
VOTE: BAKER V. CARR AND THE AMERICAN LEVELLERS (1972).
38. Hardy and Sohner, Constitutional Challenge and Political Response:
California Reapportionment, 1965, 10 WEST. POLITICAL Q. 733 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hardy and Sohner].
39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and companion cases.
rymanders. Thus the courts served as the powerful legal exter-
minators of the silent and constitutional gerrymanders.
Even with a relatively equal basis for restricting after each
census, the disparities still exist and possibly will grow during
this decade. Some extremes may occur, such as the 13th Califor-
nia Congressional 40 district (1961) which was underpopulated
with 368,100 people in 1960 and overpopulated with 565,400 by
1966, but such variations will be the exception, rather than the
rule. Indeed, technically if the growth occurs between regular
redistricting actions (e.g. between censuses) it is not a gerryman-
der, since the original district was relatively equal to other elec-
toral units of that time. Continual redistricting is hardly war-
ranted, and the stability of district identity probably outweighs
the advantage of interim tinkering. Even assuming that the term
"silent gerrymander" was inappropriately used, it would be a
specie of short lifespan. Population growth and mobility are
natural during a decade, and they hardly warrant a continual
effort at precise equality. Actually, the lack of precise figures,
or at least common figures that the redistricting actors will
accept, discourages redistricting efforts between censuses.
The Concentration Gerrymander. A concentration gerry-
mander consolidates a political party's strength in a district, or
in a few districts, normally to minimize representation for op-
position voters. With opposition concentrated in a minimum
number of districts, the other districts become less competitive
or, in other words, dominated by the party doing the redistrict-
ing. The principle of the concentration gerrymander can best be
illustrated by a hypothetical situation (See Chart 1). In the ex-
treme form Party B's majority vote could be deprived of its
majority by judicious concentration of its strength in the one
district. In a concrete example, the 1951 Republication legisla-
ture in California created concentration gerrymanders of pro-
found effect on the representation of Democrats in Los Angeles
County.4 1 Los Angeles Democratic voters were concentrated in
large congressional districts of about 425,000 each, while Repub-
lican areas were carved into districts of 225,000 each. Over the
decade this provided the Democrats with four of twelve Con-
gressmen representing Los Angeles County. Although in elec-
tions the Democratic vote was approximately fifty percent of
the total vote, Democrats were unable to elect six of the twelve
congressmen because their strength was heavily concentrated
40. All references to "districts" are to Congressional districts unless other-
wise specified.
41. Reapportionment of 1951, supra note 29 at 249-77, 404-08.
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in four districts. In 1958, when the Democratic percentage of the
total vote went up to nearly 60%, the Democrats were able to
obtain only five of the twelve congressmen or 41.66% of the
representation.
In 1961 the Democrats, a majority in the state legislature,
accomplished a reversal of the 1951 Republican concentration
effort. Republicans in 1962, 1964, and even 1966 with a Republi-
can surge, received less representation than their proportion of
the vote (e.g. 1962 48.2% of the vote, 34.2% of the representation;
in 1964 47.0% of the vote, 39.5% of the representation; in 1966
53.7% of the vote, 44.7% of the representation).42 Both parties,
thus, employed the concentration to gerrymander efficiently,
but a subtle difference can be noted. The Republicans in the
1951 reapportionment used the concentration of population and
of Democratic voters to accomplish their aims. In 1961 the Dem-
ocrats created relatively equally populated districts with one
exception, but Republican voters were heavily concentrated in
only a few districts.43
Although the concentration variety of the gerrymander usual-
ly applies the technique to the opposition party, occasions may
exist when the redistricters concentrate themselves. While Re-
publicans in California were concentrating Democrats in 1951,
Republicans in New York were consolidating their own strength
in Brooklyn to insure the election of one Republican in the
overwhelming Democratic area.44 . The result was the "silk-
stocking" 12th district in New York. It is difficult to determine
whether the term "stocking" is meant to describe its weird
shape or the type of wealthier citizen that populated the district.
The different purposes for the consolidation of voters sug-
gests that concentration gerrymanders could be sub-divided
into two categories: the concentration-of-you gerrymander and
the concentration-of-us gerrymander. In- terms of techniques a
42. D. ALLEN, SR., supra note 9 at 30, surveys the statewide disparities
between 1952-1964. The 1966 percentages were computed independently.
43. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS AND REAP-
PORTIONMENT, 1961 at 29 (1961).
44. Roberts, The Donkey, the Elephant, and the Gerrymander, 7 THE RE-
PORTER, Sept. 16, 1952 at 30-33; and Tyler and Wells, supra note 34 at 224. The
Republican dilemma in the inner cities is reflected in the necessity of using the
same technique in Queens to save a Republican seat in 1961; see New York
Times, February 28, 1968.
distinction could be drawn between the concentration of popu-
lation and the concentration of opposition vote. In the former
the disparities of population accomplish the purpose, while in
the latter the districts are relatively equal in population but the
voters of one party are stacked in a few districts.
Ethnic politics of the 1960s and 1970s have brought about
another sub-specie of the concentration gerrymander: the
minority concentration gerrymander. 5 The evolution of this
sub-specie is a reflection of American politics in the post-war
World War II era. The California situation is a graphic portrayal
of the problems and issues. In 1951 Recublicans concentrated
Negro voters in a small number of districts, but in only a very
few districts did their numbers encourage the election of Ne-
groes. In Los Angeles the Negro population was subdivided to
prevent the election of a Negro congressman. The Republican
action was branded as "ghettoization" and deplored as contrary
to American ideals and the dreams of an integrated society.
Negro spokesmen proclaimed desires to vote for "the man"
rather than for minority representation. 46 By the 1961 reappor-
tionment Negro spokesmen had organized a "two-four" com-
mittee (two congressmen and four assemblymen) to actively
demand Negro representation.4 7 By 1971 the Mexican-American
voters were in on the action, calling for representation to corre-
spond with their 15% of the total population. In the two latter
reapportionments, and two in between, minority leaders were
calling for their concentration to obtain representation. 48
The expectation that people would vote for the "man" regard-
less of whether he was black, chicano or white, had yielded to
the acceptance of the political reality that concentration of eth-
nic minorities probably was a more realistic approach to their
political aspirations. The demands created serious problems for
the Democratic Party, in whose coalition the minorities were
often included. If minority strength was concentrated, the Dem-
ocratic strength in other districts was weakened. The concen-
tration-of-us had dangerous potentials. At the same time the
45. For a recent example of this phenomenon, see, United Jewish Organi-
zation of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, - S. Ct. - (1977).
46. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HEARINGS BEFORE SPECIAL SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON REAPPORTIONMENT, REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL DIS-
TRICTS, 439 (1960).
47. Way, California: 'Brutal Butchery of the Two-Party System'?, in THE
POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT, 254 (M. Jewell ed. 1962).
48. Sacramento Bee, September 29, 1971; Sacramento Legal Press,
November 8, 1971; Los Angeles Daily Journal, November 8, 1971; Sacramento
Union, November 9, 1971; and Santa Cruz Sentinel, October 27, 1971.
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concentration of minority strength had further implications for
minorities themselves. Did the desire for a few blacks in the
legislature (national or state) and the need to concentrate black
voters to accomplish that goal, outweigh the advantage of hav-
ing several white congressmen in the legislature whose partial
black constituency would require their attention to black is-
sues? Whatever the merits of the latter viewpoint, the dilemma
has been resolved in metropolitan areas of many parts of the
nation by the creation of districts which concentrate minorities.
Whether such districts are unnatural, arbitrary, or unfair de-
pends on the viewer's perspective.
The Elongated or Shoe-String Gerrymander. Such a district
implies that the boundaries of the constituency are long and
rambling, with narrow connections. If such a district is created
for a political purpose-hence, properly called a gerrymander-
it usually is done to concentrate voters. The Republicans in 1951
did this in the California 26th District and the New York 12th
District. The same technique could be used to disperse strength
or to eliminate it, but the more common purpose is to concen-
trate, and the party membership concentrated reveals the politi-
cal purpose.
Shoestring districts, however, are probably the most confus-
ing and misinterpreted. Their odd shapes almost immediately
elicit the term gerrymander. Often the district is not a gerry-
mander, but the configuration may prompt that characteriza-
tion, as in the "saddlebag" and "belt line" districts in Illinois, the
"dumb-bell" in Pennsylvania, the "staircase" in Indiana, or
"hammer" in Missouri.49 An extended narrow district hemmed
in by mountains, or consisting of a long valley, may be natural
and far from arbitrary even when not compact on a map. In a
colorful speech, a California legislator deplored the inclusion of
Santa Catalina and San Clemente Islands in his district. 50 The
islands had insignificant population but were part of Los
49. P. REINSCH, AMERICAN LEGISLATURES AND LEGISLATIVE METHODS, 202
(1913); J. BRYCE, 1 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 124 (New York: Macmillan
and Co., 1895). The "galloping horse" and the "lop-eared rabbit" have been
located in a recent Delaware case that includes an extensive analysis of ger-
rymandering practices Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1967).
50. Inglewood Daily News, March 21, 1951; Los Angeles Examiner, March
28, 1951, Hollywood Citizen News, March 28, 1951; and Hardy personal
memorabilia re: 1951 reapportionment.
Angeles County and had to be attached to one of the Los
Angeles districts. He said he only wanted a district not an em-
pire. He begged the redistricters to return the goats and sheep
and give him back his constituents "who split their infinitives
and dangled their participles." Again, the key is intent.
In the 1940 Life article some fascinating examples of peculiar-
shaped districts with animated features made up the "political
zoo," but an analysis of those districts would reveal that the
geographical features shaped some of them and thus do not
necessarily constitute gerrymanders. In Professor Brunn's
book a figure entitled "Gerrymandered Congressional Dis-
tricts"'" includes three of the four California districts that hard-
ly qualify as gerrymanders though their shape may be odd. The
indentations and extensions reflect whole counties whose integ-
rity was respected as well as the peculiar population concentra-
tions that required jumping mountain ranges somewhere. Simi-
larly, it is inaccurate to term the California 2nd District (1951,
1961) a gerrymander. 52 The 350-mile-long district, involving
nineteen counties may look like a gerrymander because of its
sprawling nature, but when the sparsely populated counties of
similar rural interests are acknowledged to be a large geo-
graphical unit and defined as such by the Census Bureau, the
gerrymander features become minimal. Even the frequently
cited California 28th District (1961) (which probably made more
textbooks than any other district since Gerry's vintage piece)
can be defined as a grouping of independent coastal cities with
common interests that warrant special consideration.
A helpful insight into judging the nature of elongated districts
which are as frequently in urban as in rural areas, relates to the
demographic origins. Often a review of earlier districts reveals
compact districts in the core sections of a metropolitan area.
Gradually the districts become elongated. The explanation is
partly demographic and partly related to the redistricters. In-
cumbents, who are usually the redistricters and the ones who
vote on the proposals, are naturally interested in perpetuating
their positions. As population moves outward to the suburbs
and represents a larger percentage of the total area, population
adjustments warrant consolidation of central districts (if the
total number of legislators remains the same) and creation of
new districts in the outlying areas. But each new district in the
suburbs may mean one less seat in the inner city that currently
51. S. BRUNN, supra note 28 at 169.
52. This example was the favorite, but erroneous, example of the late Peter
Odegard.
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has a representative with a vote on the redistricting proposals
which logically may liquidate his district. A happier solution is
the elongated district. Incumbents residing in the core area can
continue their districts, which are declining in relationship to
total population by extending their political boundaries into the
suburbs by elongation, and thereby acquire sufficient popula-
tion to justify the continuation of their position. Often unnatural
districts are the result of the natural inclination of politicians to
perpetuate themselves.
An alternative to the elongation rearrangement is the consoli-
dation of the inner city districts and the creation of new districts
in the suburbs with the incumbent of the former district trans-
ferring his political base to a new area whose population may be
more friendly to his perpetuation aspirations. This is especially
true of white politicians in areas of minority influx.
The efforts of core area politicians to perpetuate themselves
might be termed an urban elongation gerrymander. The poten-
tial of the technique in reverse has not been ignored by rural
interests. Rural districts scheduled for liquidation can be con-
tinued by insertion into the metropolitan core area to attain
sufficient population for their justification. The rural elonga-
tion gerrymander -is demonstrated by the congressional district-
ing in the Dallas and Fort Worth area. The result of the urban or
rural elongation gerrymander denies the growing areas (subur-
ban or urban) their own representation, while the areas of de-
cline (the core and rural) continue their power. The rationale of
dividing the core area can extend to local level of government.
Supervisorial districts often divide the metropolitan center to
minimize its impact.
An interim arrangement between the elongated district and
the new district dilemma is the slinky district. Like the toy from
which the name is derived, the incumbent gives up a portion of
his original district and picks up population compensation by a
slight expansion of his district outward. In the next redistricting
he gives up more of his original base and compensates by fur-
ther extensions, and so on. A prime example of this technique is
the evolution of the California 57th Assembly District (1951,
1961, 1965, 1967).
The elongation district may be a gerrymander or it may not
be. Its purpose is the key which requires more than superficial
analysis. The map configuration may be very misleading as to
whether an elongation gerrymander exists.
The Dispersal Gerrymander. A dispersal gerrymander is the
reverse of the concentration gerrymander. As the name implies,
rather than concentrating voters in one district, or in a few
districts, an effort is made to divide one party's strength and to
overwhelm it by the more dominant vote of the other party.
If carefully arranged, the dispersal gerrymander can max-
imize political potential. Theoretically, a party of relatively
equal strength could be completely denied representation if its
strength could be equally dispersed to make it a minority in all
districts. More usually the dispersal technique is combined with
a concentration arrangement in a minimum number of districts.
The party which is competitive in the total vote may become a
distant second party in terms of representation. If the dominant
party maintains its majorities, which is likely in view of the
original redistricting, it can perpetuate its political base by fur-
ther redistricting, or it can simply refuse to enact new redistrict-
ing legislation. It is the latter approach that allowed rural legis-
lators (usually Republicans in the North and Democrats in the
South) to continue their power into the 1960s. It is also the
method by which Ohio and Michigan Republicans have bene-
fited from reapportionment practices.
If the New York Democrats had been in control of redistrict-
ing in the 1950s, and had the Republicans created the 12th dis-
trict to work with, the easy solution would have been to disperse
the Republicans among the Democratic districts and gain
another Democratic seat in the process. In terms of concrete
examples of the dispersal techniques, the famous North Caro-
lina "bacon-strip" districts are instructive. 3 Republican
strength in North Carolina had been concentrated in the west-
ern mountain sections, where similar social and economic inter-
ests prevail. If those counties were combined into congressional
districts, Republican congressmen would be elected. Democrats
have chosen the dispersal alternative. A few Republican coun-
ties are grouped with Democratic counties in the central section
of the state. The effect created one-county-wide congressional
districts that run horizontally across the state, creating what
53. D. Orr, Jr., Congressional Redistricting: The North Carolina Experi-
ence, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill, 1969); D. Orr, Jr., The Persistence of the Gerrymander in North Carolina
Congressional Redistricting, 9 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 29-54 (1969); and P.
EDSALL, North Carolina: 'This Bill or Nothing', in THE POLITICS OF REAPPOR-
TIONMENT, at 191-203 (M. Jewelled., 1962).
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some have called bacon strips. Although the technique has paid
off for decades the adjustments in the 1960s backfired as a
result of public rejection of the infamous practices.5 4
From a political viewpoint the dispersal gerrymander is the
most desirable, for by such means an opponent can be
weakened significantly beyond his true strength. It is, however,
a dangerous technique. As David Mayhew observes:
The reason is that parties with absolute control over districting tend to
be very greedy. A controlling party normally concedes a minimum of
very safe districts to the opposition and then tries to salvage as many
as possible for its own adherents. In this latter effort there is a tenden-
cy to spread electoral resources too thinly.
55
Numerous examples can be cited. For example, in California
the 25th and 21st Congressional Districts (1961) were created to
satisfy the personal ambitions of state legislators for congres-
sional careers. Both districts were marginally Democratic and
fell to Republicans in the 1966 landslide. In Indiana redistricting
for the 1970s the effective dispersals with the political data of
national operatives won seven of the eleven seats in 1972, aided
potentially by the Nixon landslide of that year. In the reversal
trend in 1974, the Democrats captured nine of the eleven seats.
Similar results can be noted in Iowa during the same period.
Even more revealing is the long record of the Missouri congres-
sional districts (1901-1931) where the Democrats dominated the
representation by dispersal gerrymanders, but in the Republi-
can landslide years (1904, 1918, 1920, and 1928) the Republicans
gained substantially. Similarly, in 1942 and 1946 the Republi-
cans swept the Democratic dispersals of the 1930s and 1940s.
These lessons are not lost to politicians.The safe district is, of
course, preferable. Dispersal gerrymanders are dangerous,
especially in years of political change. Redistricting measures
are passed by incumbents upon whom the lesson of dispersal
dangers are most pressing. Those who favor redistricting pro-
posals, seeking widespread support among their colleagues
with whom they will work in the next decade, are aware of the
desire (continuation in office) and fear (defeat). Such conditions
54. D. Orr, Jr., supra note 53 at 29-37.
55. D. Mayhew, Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in
Drawing the Districts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's, 277 (N. Polsby ed.
1971).
favor what Mayhew has termed the bipartisan gerrymander
and the individual gerrymander. 6 With strong party organiza-
tions equally balanced, one party dominating one house and the
other party the second house, or with one party controlling the
executive and the other party regulating the legislature, the
party leaders work out mutually satisfying redistricting propos-
als. These typically produce concentrated gerrymanders, with a
few marginal districts, in order to avoid jeopardizing the bal-
ance. With weak party organizations, or in one-party states, the
negotiations tend to be on an individual basis, hence the term
"individual gerrymander."
Without quibbling about Mayhew's terminology at this point,
it may be said that the dangers of the dispersal and the preva-
lent bipartisan and individual practices, point to one of the
major misconceptions about gerrymandering. Though the dis-
persal technique can be highly effective, the inclinations of
politicians move in opposite directions. Though the redistricting
process and its malfunctioning in the form of gerrymanders
may be conceived as a partisan exercise in which the actors can
manipulate unchecked for the party's advantage, the bipartisan
and club-like legislative atmosphere presents powerful deter-
rents to effective partisan action. Again the reality of the proc-
ess, lack of knowledge of the political actualities in shaping a
redistricting measure, or the tendency of academicians to judge
on the basis of normative thinking rather than empirical prac-
tices, perpetuate redistricting and gerrymander misconcep-
tions.
The Elimination Gerrymander. Dispersal and concentration
techniques are also employed to create a fifth major type of
gerrymander. The elimination gerrymander is designed for the
purpose of eliminating an incumbent by isolating him from his
base of support so that he will find re-election difficult.
A classic example of this technique occurred in three San
Francisco assembly districts in 1951. 57 The loss of two seats in
San Francisco required a complete reorganization of the dis-
tricts. In the process three Democratic assemblymen found
themselves in three entirely different districts, with their former
neighbors each having substantial portions of another's district.
In the same redistricting, the two San Francisco congressional
districts shifted axis, making re-election of Congressman
Franck R. Havenner difficult. In a similar effort against another
56. Id. at 277-84.
57. Reapportionment of 1951, supra note 29 at 134-53, 155-59, and map on
393.
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liberal Democrat, the Republicans, in 1951, stripped the Califor-
nia 18th District (1941) of the northern Democratic sections
which had assured Congressman Clyde Doyle of his victories in
1944 and 1948. Fortunately for Congressman Doyle a new dis-
trict was available into which he moved and won.5 8 Congress-
man Havenner was not so fortunate.
The generally successful purging of the liberal Democratic
ranks in 1951 was not forgotten by the Democrats in 1961. In the
latter year the Democrats reconstructed the districts of two
members of the John Birch Society to make their re-elections
difficult. A third Republican also found his district altered to
deny him re-election.59 As a political ploy two other Republican
congressmen and four assemblymen in the same locality were
threatened with extinction by the same technique. Compro-
mises in the final bills modified the proposals and won several
Republican votes for the Democratic reapportionment plans.
The elimination gerrymander requires careful analysis to de-
termine the nature of the action. When a state loses a seat, or
seats, obviously some district will have to be eliminated and its
incumbent is not necessarily gerrymandered out of office. On
the other hand when the political entity retains the same
number of districts and one of the incumbents is not reelected,
an elimination gerrymander may be a factor. When an entity
gains representation, such as Los Angeles County did in 1951
and 1961, and one or more of the incumbents finds his district
eliminated or re-organized to his detriment an elimination ger-
rymander exists. The elimination gerrymander may also be
used against a non-member of the legislature. If an incumbent
anticipates a potential opponent in the next primary or general
election, the legislator may attempt to draw him out of the new
district. In 1951 a former assemblyman residing in the City of
Hawthorne was an incumbent's potential opponent. When the
lines were redrawn, the City of Hawthorne was removed from
58. Id. at 255-58; concerning the Havenner problem see the Holtville
Tribune, March 8, 1951 and the San Francisco Sun Reporter, March 21, 1951.
59. These observations are drawn from personal experiences as consultant
to the California Assembly in the 1961 redistricting. The purging of liberal
Democrats in 1951 and conservative Republicans in 1961 suggests that the mo-
rality gerrymander may be subspecie of the elimination gerrymander. The
technique is used to eliminate individuals whose political morality does not
correspond to that of the redistricters.
the district and a potential bid by a rival was thereby rendered
unlikely.
60
When a state loses a seat, or seats, and someone has to go, it is
sometimes surprising how readily incumbents can agree on who
it should be-first, anyone but me, and, second, the member
who generally bothers his colleagues for one reason or another.
Often the agreement is bipartisan. In more fortunate circum-
stances, at least for the incumbents, one of the members may
decide to retire. In 1971 the retirement of an incumbent eased
loss of one seat in Ohio.61 If the seniority of the older member is
deemed valuable, the youngest freshman may be the sacrificial
lamb. Often the hand of death may settle the issue. Alabama,
faced with the loss of one seat in 1971, found the Democratic
legislators considering the elimination of the seat of Republican
William L. Dickinson. The question was in which Democratic
district should his base be placed, the 3rd of the 4th. Incumbent
George W. Andrews of the 3rd died, and the dilemma was
solved.62
The Projection Gerrymander. Often related to the elimina-
tion specie is the projection gerrymander-a district designed to
fulfill the political ambitions of an individual. Often the individ-
ual is a member of the legislature. He will have a vote on the
redistricting legislation. During a redistricting action the capitol
rumors will abound in speculation about who wants to go to
congress, especially when new seats are available. Outsiders
friendly to the dominant party may have ambitions for the con-
gressional seats, or for the state legislature itself, and the redis-
tricters may respond to such desires. Sometimes the managers
of the redistricting legislation will use the projection gerryman-
der to elevate their internal rivals to federal posts, thus remov-
ing them from the state legislature. A district designed specifi-
cally for an individual would qualify as a projection gerryman-
der, which in some cases may also be the elimination gerryman-
der of another.
One of the most fascinating projection gerrymanders of the
1970's centered on the California 38th District (1971).63 The ulti-
mate new 38th District was one of five new congressional dis-
tricts California was entitled to in 1971. It had the potential of
60. Reapportionment of 1951, supra note 29 at 230.
61. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE
1970's 147 (1973).
62. Id. at 9.
63. These observations are drawn from personal experiences as consultant
to the California congressional delegation, 1970-1972.
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being one of the two Democratic districts in the bipartisan pro-
gram to split the gain of five: 2 Democratic, 2 Republican and
one party-neutral. Among the Democrats interested in the dis-
trict were four prominent contenders-the son of a political
"fat-cat", a former congressman whose seat was now occupied,
a leader in the local Mexican-American community, and the
former congressional candidate in the local area who had been
just barely defeated in 1970. As the legislation wandered
through the legislative process, the lines of the proposed 38th
changed daily, and toward the end, hourly. Each of the contend-
ers had his supporters for various reasons-the struggle was a
microcosm of Democratic coalition politics. Ideological liberals
fought for their champion, labor leaders for their candidate,
Mexican-Americans for theirs, with Negroes supporting each
element from time to time. With a Democratic majority of one in
the state senate and two in the Assembly, each element had its
veto, and the lines shifted accordingly-the liberal out, the Mex-
ican-American in with his local area, the former candidate in
and out. In the final bill, all the contenders were in and all
fought for the primary nomination.
Unfortunately for the analysis of elimination and projection
gerrymanders the motivations of the participants cannot easily
be assessed. Few individuals will openly talk of their plans in
advance on the record for fear that constituents from the old
district may feel neglected, or rejected, or consider their repre-
sentative too ambitious. On the other hand, the ultimate redis-
tricting action may force a state legislator to look elsewhere for
his political future. One state legislator in 1951 reported that his
state assembly district was made so difficult for him that the
new congressional district was more appealing than certain de-
feat in his current legislative district.64
Fortunately, courts do not have to deal with elimination or
projection gerrymanders, and they are included in the classifi-
cation system only for completeness. Redistricting is not an act
for the perpetuation of incumbents, or for the ambition of by-
standers. Redistricting is a process by which representation of
the electorate is assured through periodic adjustments to new
64. Personal interview with Congressman-elect Robert Condon, December,
1952.
circumstances and notable demographic shifts in the context of
the one man one vote ideal. Courts would not, presumably, take
jurisdiction over a complaint that so-and-so had been denied his
seat. However, the courts may face decisions about the gerry-
mander in general, in which case an awareness of the political
element in all its facets is important.
3) Analysis: What a Gerrymander is Not
A classification system of gerrymanders may be further
clarified by the question: What is not a gerrymander? Although
any district line has political implications and in some manner
provides an advantage to one party or another, such a generali-
zation implies that all districts are gerrymanders.
In the present context it should be emphasized that the equity
of a redistricting cannot be judged on the basis of statewide
registration figures. Not every district can be created with a
50-50 registration, especially in a state where the registration
figures are 60-40, or 70-30. In any state certain areas will have
preponderant registrations in one direction or another, e.g.,
black areas may have 90-10 Democratic registrations, Chicano
areas 70-30, while wealthy foothill communities, or ocean front
properties may have a 30-70 ratio in favor of the Republicans. If
the total state or county registration were 58% Democratic and
42% Republican, districts reflecting the overall ratio could be
created only by dividing the natural community areas to link
overwhelmingly Democratic areas with overwhelming Republi-
can areas. The district lines to create such a condition would be
rambling, extended, and probably narrow. Natural com-
munities would be split by unnatural lines to achieve a theoreti-
cal norm that in the name of the concept (e.g., representative
government) would destroy the concept (by creation of unnatu-
ral areas impossible to represent or to understand). It would be
comparable to the person who demands proportional represen-
tation from a single-member district system. In order to create
proportional representation, gerrymanders would have to be
created to alleviate the system that itself has been called a gerry-
mander. Furthermore, it is obvious that a gerrymander cannot
be judged simply on the basis of numbers and unusual cartog-
raphy. The mania for mathematical exactitude is preposterous,
especially in view of the imprecise nature of census figures
which are nonetheless the best figures available. When the 1960
figures must be used for actions in the late 1960s, when the
population variations are substantial but exactitude of old fig-
ures is demanded, the numerical analysis reaches the ridicu-
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lous. Similarly, the automatic naming of peculiar shapes on the
map as gerrymanders is not appropriate.
Prior to the revolutionary cases of the 1960s, the term gerry-
mander was frequently used to cover a multitude of sins. In
particular, it was common to describe representative systems
based on the little federal plan as gerrymanders because of the
great numerical disparities between districts based on counties
with equal representation and those with larger population. The
apportionment system may have been inequitable and unfair to
the interests concentrated in the resultant districts, but until the
court entered the picture, the apportionment system was the
legal framework upon which the government system was built.
In many cases the assumed inequitable and unfair apportion-
ment system that was inappropriately called a gerrymander
had been approved by popular vote. In California, for example,
in'two of three elections the people of Los Angeles County voted
for representative patterns that were to their numerical disad-
vantage. 65 However, until the courts ruled otherwise, notably in
Lucas v. Colorado,66 the constitutional apportionment systems
in many states called for county representation.. Among the
typical requirements were the grouping of whole counties and
limitations on the percentage of representatives from any one
county.
By way of illustration, the California constitution required no
more than three counties to be grouped together to form a state
senatorial district and no county could have more than one state
senator. The Los Angeles senatorial district had 6,380,711
people in 1960 and the smallest senatorial district had 14,294.
They were not gerrymanders. The constitution provided a sys-
tem of apportionment that was inequitable, and it was ultimate-
ly ruled by the courts to be unconstitutional, but a manipulation
of district lines was not involved.67 In the lower house, assembly
districts could not cross county lines. 68 Inequities existed as a
result. For example, Imperial County boxed in by Riverside and
San Diego Counties had to have one representative for 62,512
people, while its neighbor Riverside had one representative for
65. D. ALLEN, SR., supra note 9 at 30-31.
66. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
67. Reapportionment of 1951, supra note 29 at 55-56, 84-85, 108-110.
68. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 6 (West 1954).
169,392 people.69 Again district lines were not being manipu-
lated. Lines dividing Riverside County to include part of the
county with Imperial County could simply not be drawn be-
cause of the constitutional provision. In relation to congression-
al districts, whole assembly districts had to be the building
blocks in the creation of national legislative districts. Assuming
that the assembly districts within a county could not be divided,
if the county had 31 assembly districts and 12 congressional
districts, some congressional districts would have two assembly
districts and others would have three. Assuming that the assem-
bly districts were equal in population (e.g., 150,000) a congres-
sional district having three assembly districts would have
450,000, while one having two assembly districts would have
300,000. If the constitutional stipulations were followed and the
disparities existed, the district would not be a gerrymander but
an apportionment system with undemocratic features, to be
corrected only by constitutional changes.
On the other hand, when the Republicans in 1951 created
assembly districts that varied in size from 115,000 to 150,000 and
proceeded to group two small districts into one congressional
district and three large districts into another, the resultant con-
gressional disparities ranged from 228,712 to 451,322 within the
same county.70 Although the redistricters blamed the disparities
on the constitution, the constitution had been manipulated for
partisan advantage and gerrymanders were established in some
of the districts. In 1961 the Democrats equalized the assembly
districts, and fourteen of the congressional districts consisted of
two assembly districts (the high being 423,282 people in the 23rd
District and the low 369,983 in the 27th District both potential
Democratic districts). The 28th Congressional District, how-
ever, was given three assembly districts, and the range became
591,822 to 369,983.71 If the constitution had been used in its nor-
mative sense (districts shall be as nearly equal in population "as
may be") the disparities would not have been so great but would
still have been substantial. At the same time, aside from the
constitutional problems the resultant districts in many cases,
both congressional and assembly, were gerrymanders. The
point is that the districts were gerrymanders not because of the
constitution, but because of other factors.
69. Reapportionment of 1951, supra note 29 at 55-56.
70. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS AND REAP-
PORTIONMENT, 1951 at 74-75 (1951).
71. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS AND REAP-
PORTIONMENT, 1961 at 28-29 (1961).
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Court decisions on the federal level 72 and on the state level 73 in
1964 and 1965 have in effect negated the constitutional rules
relative to the grouping of whole counties and (in California) the
grouping of whole assembly districts. Such negation was the
only means by which equality of population could be achieved.
Ironically, more equitable districts have been created to the
pleasure of "number-counters", but the opportunity for ger-
rymandering has increased-and has been utilized.74 As Justice
White has observed:
Today's decision on the one hand requires precise adherence to admit-
tedly inexact census figures, and on the other downgrades a restraint
on a far greater potential threat to equality of representation, the
gerrymander. Legislatures intent on minimizing the representation of
selected political or racial groups are invited to ignore political boun-
daries and compact districts so long as they adhere to population
equality among districts using standards which we know and they
know are sometimes quite incorrect. I see little merit in such a confu-
sion of priorities.
75
4) The Incumbent Factor
A final consideration that has been implicit in earlier remarks
but which warrants special attention to clarify the nature of the
gerrymander is the motivation of the redistricters, in most
cases, legislators. A study of the Illinois reapportionment prac-
tices concluded that districts were created with the following
interests in mind: (a) individual preservation, i.e., the creation of
a "safe" district for incumbents; (b) mutual preservation be-
tween incumbents, frequently cutting across party lines; or, in
other words, a preservation of the "club" made up of incum-
bents of both parties; (c) the preservation of political power by
the majority party; and (d) preservation of blocs (such as the
"farm bloc" or the "rural bloc") in the legislature without regard
for party lines.76
Thomas Page, in a study of Kansas reapportionment, noted
72. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) and companion cases; Wesberryv.
Sims, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
73. Silver v. Jordan, 241 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
74. An interesting analysis of the potentials for gerrymandering is found in
S. Slingsby, The Gerrymander: Its Rise, Use and Potential (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School 1967).
75. Wells v. Rockefeller, 397 U.S. 542 (1969).
76. G. STEINER and S. GOVE, THE LEGISLATURE REDISTRICTS ILLINOIS, 7
(1956).
that the shaping of Congressional districts kept the metropoli-
tan centers separate, preserved incumbency, and disturbed as
few political boundaries as possible.77 Charles Young, in his
study of political redistricting, lists the following factors in the
redistricting process (in order of importance): (1) mutual self-
protection (2) protection of incumbents in other legislative
bodies (such as congressmen or state senators), (3) protection of
regional interests, (4) maintenance of rural dominance, (5) pres-
ervation of localism, (6) recognition of geographical barriers
and demographic data, and (7) manipulation of districts for the
advantage of political parties. 78
Contrary to the usual generalizations about gerrymanders as
a technique for achieving partisan advantage, it is significant
that manipulation of districts for the advantage of political par-
ties is last on Young's list, and is not outstanding in the two
others. A perusal of recent literature and the Congressional
Quarterly accounts of congressional redistricting in the 1960s
and 1970s does not suggest a need to alter the system of
priorities.79 Incumbency is an important-if not the important-
element in district creation, where gerrymanders are spawned.
State legislators are in an advantageous position in the proc-
ess-they normally vote on their future districts. Congressmen
also attempt, with varying degrees of success, to protect their
incumbency with only secondary concern for the party interests
as such.80 Thus a congressman with a heavy registration of his
party can give surplus party voters to marginal districts for
party advantage. Most congressmen profess such willingness,
but their actions often are not convincing. Frequently they are
motivated by the following description:
Every politician and office-holder dreads change; his particular ob-
session is an overhauling and revision of political boundaries which
may endanger re-election prospects or necessitate more active cultiva-
tion of altered districts. It requires only a few years for even second-
rate congressmen to establish contacts with mothers, babies, and "the
boys" to build up an organization and catalogue his district so that
keeping it happy and safe is an easy job; others do it for him, as a rule.
The addition of another ward, or even a few blocs, is as perilous as a
leap in the dark. It means making new friends, subsidizing new politi-
cal hangers-on and a lot of doorbell-ringing and hand shaking that is
most distasteful . . . they are in no mood to exert themselves. Mainte-
77. T. PAGE, LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN KANSAS, 51 (1952).
78. C. Young, The Politics of Political Boundary Making, 369-88 (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles 1959).
79. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
WASHINGTON, D.C. (1966); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL Dis-
TRICTS IN THE 1970's, passim (1973).
80. Hardy, Congressional Redistricting in California, 1965-67: The Quilt-
ing Bee and Crazy Quilts, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 757-92 (1973).
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nance of the established order, the usual majorities-these are the
things which delight a congressman's bulging heart.
Then again, enlargement of a man's district may pit him against a
popular and ambitious foe, either for nomination or re-election.
81
When evaluating gerrymanders, the self-interest must always
be kept in mind. Often it reveals the reason for the redistricting
boundaries, e.g., the incumbent's home may be at the edge of the
district or his potential opponent just outside the line. Of course,
many of the reasons are lost in the mysteries of politics, but
others are evident. The citizen and the scholar are frequently
surprised by the trivial reasons for the creation of a line. 82 A few
examples may be noted: desire to dispense with a certain local
dedicated precinct worker ("she loses more votes than she
gains"), to retain a mother's residence in the district ("at least I
can count on her vote"-the district was overwhelmingly of his
party), to keep his home (or potential home) in the new district,
or the confidence of camaraderie ("they love me down there"-
so much so that they ousted him in the next primary).
Studies suggest that the usual allusion to gerrymandering as a
process which political parties use to bolster their power may be
a gross oversimplication. It assumes a strong political party
organization to implement the party will. Legislators who do the
redistricting are not prone to commit political harikari but
rather are motivated by self-preservation. Only secondarily is
their political party's welfare considered. Because congression-
al redistricting is one step removed from the state legislators it
is not surprising that a party's interests can better be handled
when congressional districts are involved. 83
Although politicians are in a gambling game, the solid bets are
favored. Thus, though dispersal gerrymanders would probably
maximize the party's strength, concentration gerrymanders are
favored by the incumbents. Experience in California, in the 1951
and 1961 and subsequent redistrictings, as well as in other
states, establishes the primary interests of the incumbents in
their own preservation. California incumbents, especially in the
81. Tucker, Our Delinquent Congress 47 NEW REPUBLIC 13 (May 26, 1926).
82. Hardy, supra note 80 at 785-88. Factors involved in the preparation of
the 1965 redistricting legislation are discussed in Hardy and Sohner, supra note
38.
83. Hardy, supra note 80 at 789-90.
State Assembly in 1951 and 1961, voted for state legislative dis-
tricts favorable to their re-election and, in turn, bound them-
selves to vote for overpopulated congressional districts. In each
case, when Democrats voted for Republican measures in 1951
and Republicans voted for Democratic proposals in 1961, their
citizens were proportionately disenfranchised, and in some
cases their political party was jeopardized.
Again the courts are not called upon to judge whether a redis-
tricting protects or destroys incumbency. Redistricting exists to
provide representation in line with the normative values of the
society, not to provide positions for politicians who might other-
wise not be able to fulfill their ambitions. However, the court
evaluating a redistricting for gerrymanders must be aware of
the nature, of motivation that often creates unnatural and arbit-
rary lines. Even when the court's agents do the redistricting, the
criteria of judgment is helpful to reveal gerrymandering prac-
tices that presumably would not exist in a court ordered plan.
5) Guidelines
Detection of the presence of this predator of representative
government is assisted by the acknowledgement of the distinc-
tive features of the principal specie of gerrymander and their
sub-specie. Some forms are quickly recognized. If a state (or any
other political entity that is to be subdivided into districts) has
not been redistricted for several years (with at least one census
intervening) and the population changes are significant, a silent
gerrymander has come into existence. The reapportioners have
chosen not to correct inequities for political reasons-to deny
new groups representation, to perpetuate the power of declining
groups, or to avoid elimination of incumbents who would be
replaced by representatives from newly populated regions. The
principle has been the same whether the reluctant actors re-
sided in rotten boroughs in 18th century England, the rural
districts in early 20th century America, or the metropolitan
ghettos of the late 20th century.
When a few districts give overwhelming votes, varying from
the state norms, to one party and the remaining districts go to
the competing party with less significant opposition, the con-
centration gerrymander exists. When the vote between the two
parties is relatively equal and one of the parties wins all the
seats, or a significant proportion, the dispersal gerrymander
has been employed. Superficially, when a congressman does not
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return after a redistricting, it is easy to assume an elimination
gerrymander may have been created. Likewise, if a quick perus-
al of a map reveals long narrow districts that string across an
entire state or community, the term gerrymander may come
quickly to mind. True though all the situations may be, the
detection of gerrymanders especially the less apparent ones,
requires a more detailed investigation.
The generalizations point to two difficulties which complicate
gerrymander detection: first, the simplification of the problem
into numbers and shapes; second, the obfuscation between elec-
toral systems and district practices. Though the literature on
reapportionment, gerrymanders, and redistricting is extensive 84
the articles often stop with an analysis-sometimes esoteric-of
numbers. During the 1950s arguments were waged over the
proper statistics to accurately reflect malapportionment.
Among the principal schemes were population variance ratios,
minimum control of population to dominate the legislative
body, and deviations from a population norm.85 The American
Political Science Association Committee on Congress urged a
maximum deviation of 15 per cent.86 Even more ingenious were
the geographical schemes to judge compactness.8 7 Unfortunate-
ly, the numerical and shape criteria only touched the surface of
analysis. The key element in a gerrymander is its political intent
or purpose, which the previous classification reflects. The num-
erical disparity or the shape may be indicative, but the ger-
rymander's essence is its politics.
Similarly, a careful distinction must be made between the
84. R. Silva and J. Boyd, Selected Bibliography on Legislative Apportion-
ment and Districting (1968).
85. Among the principal schemes are: Dauer and Kelsay, Unrepresentative
States, 44 NAT'L MUN. REV. 571-75, 587 (Dec. 1955); P. DAVID and R. Eisenberg,
Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote (1961); Schubert and Press,
Measuring Malapportionment, 58 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 302-27 (1964); Clem,
Measuring Legislative Malapportionment, 7 MIDWEST J. POLITICAL SCI. 125-44
(1963); see also Clem, Problems of Measuring and Achieving Equality of Repre-
sentation in State Legislatures, 42 NEB. L. REV. 622-43 (1963).
86. Chafee and Holcombe, The Reapportionment of Congress, 45 AM.
POLITICAL Sci. REV. 153-57 (1951).
87. Reock, Measuring 'Compactness' as a Requirement of Legislative Ap-
portionment, 5 MIDWEST J. POLITICAL Sm. 70-74 (1961); Schwartzberg, Reappor-
tionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of Compactness, 50 MINN. L. REV.
443-52 (1966).
disparity of votes received and representation obtained on the
basis of the electoral system and inequities caused by redistrict-
ing manipulation of the electoral system.
The United States has generally employed a single-member
district electoral system rather than multi-member districts
with a proportional representation electoral system. Each elec-
toral system has its advantages and disadvantages. In particu-
lar, the relationship of the single-member district electoral sys-
tem to a two-party system is important.88 Given a single-member
district system the results will not be proportional. Yet many
critics argue as if a single-member electoral system should pro-
duce proportional representation. For example, among the fre-
quent demands made by Mexican-Americans in recent Calif or-
nia redistricting controversies were for six congressmen, twelve
assemblymen, and six state senators to correspond to their 15%
of the state's population.8 9 Given the dispersal of Mexican-
Americans in California, single-member districts could under
no circumstance produce the 15% representation in any categ-
ory. The spokesmen for such groups are either merely creating
political rhetoric, or they do not understand the nature of the
representative system of which they are a part. Californians do
not have, and never have had, a proportional representation
system. If the advantages of the latter system are sought, the
solution is the adoption of the system through constitutional
means.
The single-member electoral system has also built in the
"cube-law" which means that the victor receives substantially
more representation than the actual vote.90 This may be undesir-
able, but the remedy depends on changing the electoral system,
not necessarily its redistricting practices. The only method to
mitigate the effects of the single-member district system would
be to resort to weird shaped districts that would destroy natural
communities by unnatural boundary lines. The asserted injus-
tice of the electoral system would be corrected by redistricting
the inequities out of existence. Changes in the electoral system
88. Especially useful in this context is S. Lipset, Party Systems and the
Representation of Social Groups, in POLITICAL PARTIES: CONTEMPORARY
TRENDS AND IDEAS, 40-74 (R. Macridis ed. 1967).
89. Hearings on Political Participation of Mexican Americans in Califor-
nia, The California State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission
on Civil Rights, 25 (August 1971).
90. Kendall and Stuart, Cubic Proportion in Electoral Results, 1 BRITISH J.
SOCIOLOGY 183 (1950). See also Hermens, Electoral Systems and Political Sys-
tems: Recent Developments in Britain, 29 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 47-59 (Win-
ter 1976).
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should be arrived at as a result of a careful examination of all
implications of the method.
Both impediments (confusion of numbers and shapes and the
electoral system with redistricting practices) to understanding
gerrymanders divert analysis from the essence. Though the
political nature of the gerrymander is deemed revealed by the
numerical and configuration analysis, or checked by the de-
tailed stipulation of procedures,9 1 the essential political nature
is neglected.
Political analysis is necessary to obtain an understanding of
gerrymanders. The important numbers are votes, not people.
For that reason a study of voting behavior is required. With
computers and a sufficient number of key-punch operators and
time, the analysis can be carried far, but the basic needs are
limited. First, voting patterns must be determined for the major
units within the state (e.g., counties first, then subunits, such as
cities, or townships, and ultimately precincts within divided
urban areas). One typical election may suffice, but a series of
elections is preferable to minimize the influence of exceptional
deviations (because of incumbency, poorly financed opposition,
weak Opponents, etc.)
To assess voting behavior, one party's vote should be chosen
and graduated. Democrats prefer to think in terms of Democra-
tic percentages, and Republicans the reverse. A six-fold break-
down of party strength is desirable; for example, Strong Dem-
ocratic-more than 60%; Democratic-55-59.9%; Leans Dem-
ocratic-50-54.9%; Leans Republican-45-49.9% Democratic; Re-
publican-40-44.9% Democratic; and Strong Republican-less
than 40% Democratic. An eight-fold graduation can be accom-
modated with provision for a Safe Democratic category for
more than 67%, and Safe Republican where the Democratic vote
is less than 33%. Each category is then assigned a color, such as
dark blue for Strong Democratic, medium blue for Democratic;
light blue for Leans Democratic; light red for Leans Republi-
can; medium red for Republican, and dark red for Strong Re-
publican. A symbol in the dark blue and dark red units can
indicate the safe categories in the respective extremes. '
If each district is colored according to its vote percentage, the
91. Two such criteria are summarized in G. Baker, supra note 8, at 205-206.
coloring may graphically reveal the nature of the redistricting
practices. If the total vote of all districts is relatively close-e.g.,
50% for Party A and 50% for Party B-and most of the districts
are colored in the leaning B category, a dispersal technique has
been implemented. Or if the same closeness prevails, but one or
two of the districts are heavily in A category (e.g., strong or safe
for A), a concentration technique has been employed. The initial
district revelations can be supplemented by coloring the basic
units used to create the districts (e.g., counties, or census tracts,
or townships) in the same graduation scheme. Such a coloring
will generally reveal concentrations of party strength, e.g., a
group of Democratic or Republican counties. 92 If the district
lines are drawn around the concentrations of one party, the
ultimate product is a concentration gerrymander. If the con-
centration of one party is dispersed, the result is a dispersal
pattern. Moreover, if the district lines between neighboring dis-
tricts are analyzed, the cut edge may be revealing. If on one side
of the line the counties are of one color, while on the other side
the counties are of another color, a concentration is suggested.
If the district goes down the middle between counties of the
same color, a dispersal technique is being utilized. When coun-
ties are split, color differences between the county parts located
in different districts may show the political purpose. Analysis of
district extremities may also be revealing. If one end, especially
in the case of the elongated districts, is of one party color and
the other end of the opposite color, a dispersal method has been
employed. Or if the district is predominantly of one color, with
an occasional patch of the opposite color, a dispersal method
has been used. In contrast, a consistence of color, or slight
variations of the same color, reveals the concentration pattern.
When such districts are compared to neighboring districts, the
purpose or the technique may become even more graphic; e.g.,
one district of one color, in the midst of a sea of districts of the
opposite, reveals concentration either to ensure the redistricting
party's representation, (New York 12th congressional district,
1951), or to minimize the opposite party's power by its concent-
ration, (California's 26th congressional district, 1951).
Determination of Democratic and Republican areas and an
analysis of the overlay of district lines on the voting behavior
maps often graphically discloses the types of gerrymanders
employed. Also useful for analysis may be the district "family-
tree." By plotting the evolution of districts over a period of time,
92. See Missouri example, infra p. 275.
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and comparing to the period before the reapportionment to the
immediate aftermath, elimination gerrymanders and redistrict-
ing designed to weaken the political strength of certain seg-
ments of the population (e.g. partisan, minority groups, etc.) can
be detected. The "family-tree" technique may not be as useful
for the immediate problems that a court faces, but it is helpful in
substantiating the classifications here developed.
It can be argued legitimately that the suggested analysis is
more pertinent to determinations after the fact, or for the pur-
poses of long-term analysis. A court often faces the problem of
determining the effect of a redistricting that has not yet been
tested, for example, before an election has been held. Aware-
ness of the analytical possibilities, however, can allow the court
to project the effects on the basis of past voting behavior, which
is the basis upon which redistricters operate. Voting statistics of
immediate past elections can hypothetically be constructed on
the basis of the new district lines to assess probable results.
6) Redistricting Practices
Before dealing with the crucial question of how much politics
is too much politics and how much is remedial, the utility of the
classification scheme needs to be tested in a practical situation.
Congressional districts in Missouri have been selected for illust-
ration because of its reputation for gerrymandering, the avail-
able literature on redistricting practices and voting behavior,93
additional convenient voting data, court actions, 94 and one long
period of redistricting stability (1901-1931).
Analysis requires a preliminary statement about the political
93. Among the better sources are: Crisler, Republican Areas in Missouri,
42 Mo. HIST. REV. 299-309 (1948) and Missouri's Little Dixie, 42 Mo. HIST. REV.
130-139 (1948); Harris, Political Trends in Missouri, 1900-1954: A Study of Local,
Regional, and Statewide Political Trends in Missouri Since 1900 (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Missouri, 1956); R. KARSCH, THE GOVERNMENT OF
MISSOURI (12th ed. 1974) (the chapter on political parties in each edition of this
work is helpful and provides political analysis over various periods); Kostbade,
Geography and Politics in Missouri (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universi-
ty of Missouri, 1957); and Sauer, Geography and the Gerrymander, 12 AM.
POLITICAL Sci. REV. 403-26 (1918). Good general overviews are included in J.
FENTON, POLITICS IN THE BORDER STATES, Chs. 6-7 (1957); and N. PEIRCE, THE
GREAT PLAINS STATES OF AMERICA, 29-78 (1973).
94. State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689(1910); State
ex rel. Lashley v. Becker, 290 Mo. 560, 235 S.W. 1017 (1921); State ex rel. Barrett
v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S.W. 40 (1912).
regions of Missouri. 95 Several writers agree that the Republican
strength in Missouri rests in the southwestern hill country, the
northern farm counties adjacent to Iowa, the German settle-
ments south of the Missouri River in eastern Missouri, in St.
Louis County, and formerly in the city of St. Louis. Conversely,
Democratic sections are located in the northeast counties ("Lit-
tle Dixie"), north of the Missouri River, in the area of central
Missouri, and in Kansas City. Alternative methods of assess-
ment (presidential elections since 1876, composite percentages
of statewide contests since 1952, and spot checks of various
local, state, and national elections since 1884) confirm the re-
gional dispositions. County variations occur among the diffe-
rent studies, and alterations are being made manifest, but the
historical patterns are not significantly changed. Often the
Democratic molds are traced to southern (slave) settlements of
the 1840s and 1850s whereas the Republican areas derive from
the arrival of Tennessee mountaineers (non-slave) in southwest-
ern Missouri and Iowa-like settlements in northern Missouri. 96
Chart 2 indicates the gradual growth and decline of Missouri's
congressional representation. Redistricting actions since 1891,
when the districts began to assume peculiar shapes, took place
in 1891, 1901, 1934, 1950, 1960, 1966, 1971, and 1973. The first two
accommodated growth, and the subsequent redistrictings dealt
with population decline. The long period from 1901 to 1931 pro-
vides a stable district pattern to test the political impact over
several elections. In 1931 a redistricting stalemate over the loss
of three congressional seats forced at-large elections.97
Chart 3 gives an analysis of the types of districts created in the
major redistricting actions. The dominant dispersal technique
contributed to overwhelming Democratic preponderance in the
congressional delegation, despite the closeness of the statewide
votes. Concentration gerrymanders are also apparent notably
the 10th (1901-1931) and the 7th Districts (1934). Going beyond
the superficial, however, the detailed district practices are in-
structive. The Democratic success between 1890 and 1930 is
largely attributable to the judicious dispersal of the southwest-
ern Republican strength among four districts, (6th, 7th, 14th,
and 16th) and the division of the northern Republican areas
between three districts (1st, 2nd, and 3rd). The German Republi-
can concentrations in eastern Missouri were cautiously divided
95. Egpecially useful are the works by Crisler, Harris, and Kostbade, supra
note 93.
96. See in particular Kostbade, supra note 93.
97. Short, Congressional Redistricting in Missouri, 25 AM. POLITICAL SCI.
REV. 634-49 (1931).
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among Democratic districts based north of the Missouri River.
Generally, the districts were vertical to allow Democratic ma-
jorities in northern counties to dip into the Republican sections
with one-county-wide inserts, while a horizontal district (the
14th) followed the state boundary almost its entire length to
absorb its share of the Republican Ozark counties to be
counter-balanced by the Democratic nucleus in the east. It is not
insignificant that the Republican proposal for adjustments in
the 1920s was generally horizontal in character and proposed
that Republican nucleus areas absorb Democratic counties in
numbers to favor elections of Republicans. 8 Chart 3 also dem-
onstrates that the population concentration gerrymander
helped the Democratic efforts. The precise nature of the dis-
tricts and the appropriate gerrymander classification clearly
emerge from more detailed analysis of the county units and
district lines.
From a political viewpoint another important feature of the
usually efficient Democratic dispersal plan was its weakness. In
the years of Republican landslides, (e.g., 1904, 1908, 1920, and
1928) or Republican presidential years, or when a Catholic Dem-
ocratic presidential nominee disrupted traditional Democratic
voting patterns in the Southern Baptist counties most districts
went Republican. Possibly because of that circumstance, espe-
cially the regularity in the 1920s, the Republicans were concen-
trated in the 7th congressional district in the 1933 redistricting.
Rather than risk the danger of Republican victories in several
districts, the threat was consolidated in one district that Repub-
licans could win while Democrats would normally carry the
other districts. In subsequent realignments, with rare exception,
the 7th congressional district remained a Republican bastion,
and each redistricting stacked on additional Republican coun-
ties as Missouri continued to lose congressional representation.
Dispersal districts prevailed elsewhere, with the continual vul-
98. Id. at 640. Mr. Short analyzed the Republican proposal in this manner:
Thus by a skillful concentration of opposition voting strength in three
districts, the creation of at least six rather closely divided districts, and
virtual certainty of carrying all four districts in St. Louis city and
county in addition to one district in each of the north-central, south-.
central, and south-western sections, the Republican legislative leaders
had assured their party of at least seven or eight of the 16 representa-
tives even in a Democratic year, and 13 or more in a Republican land-
slide such as occurred in 1920.
nerability to landslides, such as that occurred again in 1942 and
1946.
The unpredictable shifts with the dispersal patterns warrant
special attention in the development of guidelines for future
courts venturing into the political thicket. In particular, atten-
tion is focused on the period of 1901-1931, during which time 240
elections took place with the same Democratic created districts.
(See Chart 3) Clearly the Democrats dominated, winning 161 of
the contests. In 103 of the 240 contests the margin of victory was
in the 47.0 to 53.0 range. When frequent vote differences were
less than 2,500 votes (in other words, a shift of 1,251 votes would
have altered the outcome) the closeness of the contests is even
more significant. Ninety-four contests fell in the 2,500 margin
category. In twelve of the sixteen districts each party won on at
least two or more occasions, and such switches were frequent.
Fifty one incumbents were defeated. Nine of the sixteen dis-
tricts had five or more congressmen. In other words only the
2nd and 10th Districts were totally safe. In the fourteen other
districts the fight was potentially close. Beneath the Democratic
preponderance was a competitive system. Each congressman
had to be aware of a potential landslide, or other adversity, and
several paid the price. Few were safe. The best defense was
attention to the district. This does not resolve the inevitable
disparities between actual statewide votes and the representa-
tion obtained under the single-member district system, but it
does add another dimension to the evaluation of gerrymander
effects.
7) The Political Essence
As implied earlier, as the courts move deeper into the political
thicket, to challenge the gerrymander monster, their decisions
concerning the eradication of the predator will be facilitated by
precise terminology and by clearer guidelines. A classification
of gerrymanders and their subspecie has been suggested to
promote more positive assessment. The procedure for political
analysis by the use of maps and district lines will assist the
detection. Gerrymander can be properly and accurately iden-
tified if the political nature is made clear and the obsession with
numbers and configurations is supplemented with essential in-
formation. On the other hand, if significant gerrymanders do
not appear and electoral disparities warrant concern, a judg-
ment of the electoral system's inequities may be appropriate,
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and another series of logical questions may be considered about
the electoral system-not redistricting practices.
Unfortunately, however, when dealing with the gerrymander,
the political dilemma remains. How much politics can be al-
lowed in a process which touches the fundamental political
heartbeat-survival of the representative system-as well as the
survival of the political actor who is also the designer of the
representation pattern? Who commits political suicide? Given
the natural inclinations of politicians to ensure their own sur-
vival-with proper genuflections to representative government
-when should the courts interfere? If the Missouri example is a
guide, the concentration gerrymander is most detrimental to the
representative system. It does not alter. On the other hand, the
dispersal gerrymander, though generally disadvantageous to
one party, has certain redeeming features. Dispersal districts
are potentially competitive. Incumbents must be alert to the
continual danger of an upset by strong and/or well financed
opponents, or other elements of adversity. Lengthy incumbency
may even lead some elected officials to believe they are invinc-
ible and to forget the marginality of their district which may
lead to their defeat. If that perspective is accepted and the court
centers its attention on the essential districting nature of the
gerrymander problem, the court might establish its own
guidelines to minimize concentration gerrymanders. Or if the
court does the redistricting to rectify inequities it could take
districts adjacent to the endangering specie, consolidate two,
three, or more districts as the case warranted, and then redraw
the lines in the area of gerrymander infestation to ensure more
competition. To draw an analogy, the court could combine a
predominantly white-corpuscle Democratic district with adja-
cent districts where red-corpuscle Republicans are dominant to
assure balance among the three districts, and to produce three
healthier electoral units.
It is the political intent that must be kept in mind in both
detection and eradication. If the advantages of the concentra-
tion gerrymander are offset by its potential breakup and neu-
tralization by the court, through consolidation with dispersal
districts and re-division to achieve more competitive districts,
the incentive to create the concentration gerrymander declines.
But what of the dispersal gerrymander? The long-term com-
petitive features may prove corrective, but the court might help
here as well. One possibility for state legislative seats would be
to provide court appointed additional representatives after each
election, to achieve a representation comparable to the
statewide vote totals.9 9 The incentive to create gerrymandered
districts, even temporarily, would be appreciably reduced. If
the additional representatives were selected from the defeated
party's top runners serving as incumbents from at-large con-
stituencies they would be potentially more effective contenders
in the district where they had previously been defeated. Since
the additional legislator's tenure would depend on the tempo-
rary judicial balancing act, the at-large representatives would
have an incentive to push for redistricting. Besides, the district
incumbents would desire to redistrict more equitably to elimi-
nate the at-large incumbent threat.
Much of the commentary about redistricting has focused on
the districting process as a means to achieve representation. It is
also a method to obtain a competitive party system.10 0 Not only
must the court assess whether the gerrymander distorts the
representative character of the political system but also
whether the manipulation makes it non-competitive. Inade-
quate though political parties may be in the representation of
popular will, political parties are the vehicles which express
political feeling throughout the electoral system. If the political
opinion of thousands of individuals (especially in trading one
set of political leaders for another) is denied expression through
district manipulation, there is a clear effect on the grand de-
pository of public will and its agents. When the public will is
polluted at its source the activities of political parties are made
meaningless.
Conclusion
As the court edges further into the recesses of reapportion-
ment it is essential to reconsider basic concepts and to use terms
correctly, or at least consistently. If the judicial officials recog-
nize the different dimensions of the reapportionment problem,
99. The proposed interim step might seem an unwarranted judicial inter-
ference with the electoral process, but the legislature could easily rectify the
situation by a prompt redistricting to eliminate the gerrymandering effects;
thus only one election need be effected by the court action. The United States
Supreme Court has registered approval of similar "minor changes in a legisla-
ture's size." See, Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187,
199 n.10 (1972) and cases cited therein. The proposed temporary remedy would
seem no more drastic.
100. R. DIXON, JR., supra note 4 at 460-63.
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separation of thistle and holly in the thicket may be easier. It is
essential to cut through the verbiage and pontification that have
contributed significantly to the confusion of issues and methods
of detection. Possibly a fundamental error about gerrymander-
ing is the failure to distinguish reapportionment from redistrict-
ing. Such words as apportionment, reapportionment, malappor-
tionment, redistricting, and gerrymandering must be differen-
tiated.
Apportionment is the original allocation of political power on
the basis of criteria of representation established by the elector-
al system; reapportionment is the periodic adjustment of the
criteria to new circumstance often brought on by social,
economic, and demographic changes; malapportionment is a
system of apportionment that does not correspond to current
conditions, or a reapportionment that violates the criteria of the
original apportionment formulas. In the first type of malappor-
tionment, new normative thought may be required to determine
the proper form of representation. That is, should the single
member district system be replaced by a multi-member district
system? Should the proportional representation system be sub-
stituted for the majority-plurality system? The second type of
malapportionment needs only a redoing in accordance with the
apportionment formula. Redistricting is a process by which dis-
tricts are re-designed to implement the apportionment formula.
Finally, gerrymandering is a manipulation of districts for politi-
cal purposes (partisan, bi-partisan, individual, etc.) that creates
a distortion of election results. Thus gerrymandering is a form
of "maldistricting."
In short, apportionment and reapportionment are formulas;
malapportionment and redistricting are processes; and ger-
rymandering is a technique.
The proposed classification system's emphasis on the qual-
ifiers (silent, concentration, dispersal and elimination) focuses
attention on the political technique being employed. If the court
determines the existence of a gerrymander, the second step is to
determine the maldistricting effect on the normative apportion-
ment formula. Is the gerrymander distorting the apportionment
system to the detriment of the system's basic tenets? If the
gerrymandering problem is approached in this manner, the
court can then determine where detrimental gerrymanders ex-
ist and proceed to eradicate them. It is not necessary to declare
the whole redistricting process invalid-only the specific gerry-
mander, or gerrymanders need be so labeled. The remedy can
take the forms suggested. Additional representatives can ap-
proximately equate the electoral votes, or court orders to re-
draw lines among adjacent districts can correct the gerryman-
der by a complete redrawing of the districts.
Numerical or geographical guidelines 01 are useful in focusing
attention on potential political manipulation-that is, on where
gerrymanders may be located. But to identify gerrymanders it
is essential to assess the political effect. To count on arithmetic
and cartography analysis as the guidelines to minimize ger-
rymanders is a will-o-the-wisp. Heretofore, analysis based on
numerical disparities, apparent violations of compactness, or
personalities, has not shown that the essence of gerrymandering
is best portrayed by an emphasis on the purpose of the redistric-
ting-controlling the opposition's voting strength. If the redis-
tricting distorts the electoral results, the logical next question is
how the strength is diluted. Reference to political data and vot-
ing behavior immediately conjures up the specter of the infam-
ous political question. The court has traditionally stayed clear
of questions involving co-equal branches and the politics of the
people. 10 2 However, within the "political thicket" the only means
to clear the underbrush is to deal with political data. The clas-
sification system and analysis suggested will assist the court in
an objective assessment of the problem.
The United States Supreme Court has proclaimed that one-
man vote is the basis for apportionment. If the electoral system
distorts the criteria, as the "little federal" plan did, then it is
unconstitutional. If the district lines of the electoral system are
manipulated to distort representation, it is a form of political
corruption that must be checked, preferably by statutory law
but otherwise by the court in the manner outlined. If the courts
recognize the difference between unrepresentative electoral
systems and the manipulation of an existing electoral system, it
must identify the endangering specie, the gerrymander. The
slaying of gerrymanders may allow luxuriant growth to trans-
form the thicket into a rose garden.
101. G. Baker, supra note 8.
102. The literature on political questions is extensive; see in particular C.
POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1936) and P. STRUM, THE
SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS:" A STUDY IN JUDICIAL EVASION
(1974). (The bibliography in the latter is especially helpful).
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